array of institutional entrepreneurs (including city governments, federal agencies, social movement organizations, etc.) mobilized around issues of safety, efficacy, intellectual property, and economic development. Each of these actors saw the opportunities and risks of biotechnology in different ways and acted according to these understandings of the value (either positive or negative) they perceived the technology could have.
We think of these interpretations of value as economic logics that comprise the organizing principles of what is valued and valuable in the institutional setup of a field (David 2003; Friedland and Alford 1991) . Central to the biotechnology case we study, and to the institutional perspective on entrepreneurship more generally, is the idea that the financial profits motivating the Schumpeterian entrepreneur are only one of many interpretations of the value of the technology that exist in the field. Other institutional entrepreneurs whose notions of value may be focused on ends other than making profits will also articulate their perspectives. What animates our enquiry is to understand the evolution of biotechnology in the marketplace and the role entrepreneurial action has in shaping this process. We find that, where there are multiple interpretations, contests between all sorts of entrepreneurs (Schumpeterian and other) about which economic logic will dominate are likely.
These contests about value are highly consequential because they have implications for the shape of the field and of the evolution of technologies within it. Yet, the mechanisms for resolving these disputes about value and the entrepreneur's role in such a process are poorly understood.
Conventionalist theory -as most comprehensively articulated by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) (and also exemplified in Beunza and Stark 2004; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Stark 2000 ) -provides a useful lens for unpacking these dynamics. This theory suggests that an economic logic defines what is of value in a particular context. Their insight is that there is no single economic logic and therefore no single articulation of value -multiple economic logics are possible and may often co-exist. Each economic logic is based in its own internally consistent sets of tests for establishing value and, more importantly, the evidence that satisfy those tests. The combination of tests and evidence provide the justification or legitimization of the value for a good. A particular sphere of action -the marketplace or elsewhere -will be governed by an institutional set up which is based in a compromise across multiple possible economic logics and which sustains an is sustained by a particular constellation of justifications. One implication of this perspective is that entrepreneurs -Schumpeterian as well as institutional entrepreneurs -will engage in contests with one another to propose and stabilize the economic logic. They seek to define the tests of value and to provide evidence that satisfy these tests.
With regard to commercializing new technologies, entrepreneurs produce or draw on a wide range of evidence: courts and government agencies making decisions defining appropriability, financial markets placing value on technologies well before products materialize, scientists producing technical evidence on viability, and firms making sense of the technology and its commercial applications. The entrepreneurial task is therefore to establish or undermine different tests of value, mobilize or suppress evidence to satisfy or refute these tests, and construct a compromise across the contested values associated with a technology. Throughout this process, we argue that entrepreneurs take action to create new logics or transform existing ones, leading to a new set of opportunities. The outcome of such entrepreneurial action strongly shapes the evolution of a technology and, therefore, the organizations that exploit it.
Through our historical analysis of the evolution of biotechnology, we show that highly varied understandings of the value embodied in biotechnology existed. Across three eras (1973-1986 and 1988-2000 and 2003-present) , entrepreneurs constructed different economic logics for biotechnology, often in highly contested settings against multiple entrepreneurial adversaries. We also find that an economic logic was not easily stabilized; biotechnology's evolution was arrested by moments when the stabilized constellations fell apart (in 1987-1989 and again in 2001-2002) and new logics were constructed. We argue that such breakdowns may occur when evidence fails to meet critical tests or when different understandings of value are in conflict. These breakdowns create new opportunities for other entrepreneurs to construct alternative economic logics.
By exploring these processes of contestation, (temporary) stabilization and subsequent breakdowns, we contribute first to the entrepreneurship literature by expanding the definition of the entrepreneurial act. We find that the entrepreneur creating a new firm to commercialize a technology, while being a Schumpeterian opportunity seeker, is also acting as an institutional entrepreneur, constructing the economic logics and institutional setups as they build their organizations. Not only does this perspective redefine the role of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, it also opens up the discussion of entrepreneurship to a whole set of different entrepreneurial actors who may not be creating firms but who are seeking to shape the economic logic and institutions which will govern the system of exchange. This full complement of entrepreneurs function like Becker's (1963) "moral entrepreneurs," each seeking to set the rules of exchange and provide evidence to support a particular institutional setup (see also Epstein 2007) .
Second, we contribute to the literature on technical change by showing that entrepreneurs are central actors in this process. Their challenge is to exploit, negotiate and resolve the uncertainties created during the emergence of a new technology. They must develop an economic logic and constitute the logic in an effective organization. In doing so, they act to change the institutional setup in a process that shapes and is shaped by the evolving technology. By taking this view, we present a broader definition of the institutional arrangements that are central to technical change, placing legal institutions promulgating and defining patent law alongside government agencies establishing safety regulations together with financial market institutions validating the financial value of a startup. By examining the entire the institutional setup, we can more precisely explain patterns of technical change. We show that such change may not be smooth, but instead can be arrested or change direction when compromises about the economic logic break down. As such, the forces shaping technology evolution are best understood as not purely technical, but also, and unavoidably, economic.
Third, while we have known since the pioneering work of Joan Woodward that different technologies require different organizational configurations (Woodward 1958) , our analysis suggests that the entrepreneurial act of defining the value of a technology and creating new organizations to constitute this value actually shapes the direction that technologies evolve. Thus, it is not simply a matter of matching an organization to a technology but rather of seeing how the creation of new organizations to commercialize technologies interacts with the definition of the technology itself in the marketplace.
Economic logics and the evolution of technology
By taking conventionalist view of the evolution of biotechnology, we suggest that the process by which entrepreneurs determined what made biotechnology valuable and figured out how to organize around such an economic logic was contested. The shape that biotechnology has ultimately taken emerged from the resolution of these contests. Convention theory -as elaborated in Boltanski and Thévenot's On Justification (2006) 1 -argues that our economy is shaped by participants affecting the rules of economic action. While most economists would argue that the assignment of value underpins any system of exchange, conventionalists suggest that this value is not only given by the principles of optimization, but instead can be derived from many possible spheres such as civic duty, attainment of fame, proof of technologic performance, demonstration of creativity, etc. More specifically, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 43) claim that the establishment of a particular logic "comes about as a part of a coordinated process that relies on two supports: a 1 This discussion of the economies of convention is also deeply influenced by David Stark's work including Stark (2000) , Girard and Stark (2002) and Beunza and Stark (2004) as well as the opportunity to read the manuscript from his forthcoming book at the Princeton University Press, provisionally titled "Assets of Ambiguity." common identification of market goods, whose exchange defines the course of action, and a common evaluation of these objects in terms of prices that make it possible to adjust various actions." Simply put, economic logics embody principles of economic coordination or conventions that guide interpretation of the technology and its value.
We use the notion of a logic as it is defined by Friedland and Alford (1991: 248-249 ) (and discussed in DiMaggio 1997: 277); a set of "material practices and symbolic constructions" that are the "organizing principles" of the institutional setup. An economic logic concerns the organizing
principles that define what is of value. It underpins a "system of exchange" (Biagioli 2000: 552fn) which can be understood as being similar to Latour and Woolgar's (1979) cycles of credit that transform valued outputs into resources for further production. The guiding focus of the conventionalist perspective is in explaining how economic action is socially constructed and in analyzing how what is valuable is determined (Stark 2000) . It relies on the idea that multiple values can co-exist, each being coherent within its own economic logic, and each of which entails its own metrics and standards of evidence for proving the value of any object or idea (Callon and Muniesa 2005) . Each logic has its own tests for value, and actions are taken with the idea that they will or at least could be subject to tests of "justification." There are various loci where the tests can play out, such as the courts, markets, labs or government agencies. The process is one of mutual substantiation in which a particular test is determined to be a deciding factor and certain evidence is deemed to be a justification. The test and the evidence are co-produced.
While the institutional perspective has highlighted the importance of logics and their institutional setup in the evolution of new industries (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2003) , the key insight of the Conventionalists is that what is valuable will differ in different spheres, not only the market, but also social, religious, civic and others. And, more importantly, that even within a given sphere there can be a contest over which particular economic logic will prevail. For example, scientists engaging in research in the academic sphere may value intellectual contribution and recognition and follow the economic logic of Open Science (David 2003; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Merton 1968) . However, scientists in industry may value relevance to practical problems.
Likewise, technologies can be subject to different economic logics in different spheres. In the market sphere, the value of a new technology will be associated with financial profit. But, in the civic sphere, the value may be in job creation or economic development. Or, in the social sphere, the value may be negative, coming in the form of fears of toxicity.
Just as Zelizer (1983; has shown that multiple logics -social and market -can affect they ways intimate goods and services are traded in the marketplace, the conventionalist view suggests that many potential economic logics can operate in a single sphere. This has been demonstrated by Lounsbury (2007) who, in his study of the mutual fund industry, identifies the contrasting trustee and performance logics that defined the values of the Boston and New Yorkbased funds respectively. In publishing, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) describe the yielding of the editorial logic to a market-oriented logic as firms in the industry changed hands and brought in professional managers. And, specifically in biotechnology, both academic and commercial (or venture capital) economic logics have been shown to operate, often in highly conflictual ways, within the academic sphere Powell and Owen-Smith 2002; Vallas and Lee 2008) . In the context of the commercialization of a new technology, we argue that the Conventionalist perspective makes room for the potential that different definitions of an economic logic associated with technology may be part of the compromise that structures the institutional setup surrounding it and allows a system of exchange to operate. The prevailing economic logic is therefore the set -or in Latour and Woolgar's (1979) language, the "lash up" -of conventions that govern the action.
The Conventionalist view sees the efforts to construct such "lash ups" as a way of dealing with the Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921 (Knight /1965 in the market. Indeed, "for the Conventions School, the process of justification (rationalization) is critical to actors assuaging their concerns about an unknowable future" (Biggart and Beamish 2003: 456 justification of a certain definition of value but also to assure that their preferred economic logic be the one structuring the process of commercialization. Actors can challenge the validity of a test, avoid a test, or introduce a test that is valid according to a different economic logic. However, the very uncertainties that usher in disputes also make negotiation and entrepreneurial action possible and even necessary (Sewell 1992 ).
The entrepreneur may be seen as the actor who can break from the existing institutional setup in the market and create new economic practices (Biggart and Beamish 2003) . Thus, rather than being passive recipients of new technologies, logics and institutions, it is likely that entrepreneurial actors will be active in developing the technology, creating an economic logic, and building a supporting institutional setup. In this sense, entrepreneurial actors of every type can engage in creative, strategic actions which can produce new sets of coordinated practices associated with a new economic logic that will shape subsequent activities in the field. Their role comes about because, as they develop and promote different economic logics, they work to generate evidence within existing institutions, act to change institutions and try to change the tests associated with these institutions. They instantiate these ideas through the organizations they build to exploit the economic logic they are promoting. Through the success of their organizations, they provide evidence that their proposed economic logic is viable, just as other types of entrepreneurs seek evidence supporting alternative views.
The constellation of features characterizing conventionalist theory make it particularly wellsuited to the analysis of the emergence of a new technology and the surrounding institutional setup.
Because new technologies are inherently equivocal (Weick 1990) , it makes sense that multiple economic logics could apply. What evidence would constitute proof of the value of such a technology would itself be inherently subject to interpretation and potentially disputed. Because future outcomes of the development of the technology cannot be predicted, entrepreneurs are those skilled and knowledgeable actors (Fligstein 2001; Giddens 1984) generating evidence, sometimes in the form of creating startup organizations, and changing institutions all in the service of establishing a particular economic logic surrounding the technology. They mobilize a wide range of evidence related to different economic logics, establish tests that match their evidence, and attempt to shape the interpretation of evidence provided by others. The outcomes of their efforts shape the direction that the technology, the organizations, the logic and its underlying institutions take.
One can see a clear connection between the conventionalist perspective on technology we propose and ideas developed in the stream of research on the social construction of technology (SCOT) (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987) . They share a focus on the interpretive flexibility of technologies (and other goods) and on the mechanisms for closure and stabilization of an artifact.
What conventionalist theory usefully adds is the focus on the establishment of tests and the mobilization of evidence as the underlying mechanisms for achieving some sort of compromise about the value of a technology. This highlights very naturally the role of advocacy and argumentation on the part of marketplace participants in shaping such outcomes. In doing so, the conventionalist conceptual toolkit directs us to explore the ways in which entrepreneurial actors go about constructing and stabilizing a particular economic logic to define whether and under what conditions stakeholders attach value to the new technology. In demystifying the tests and evidence that validate the tests, the conventionalist perspective also highlights the degree to which compromises are fragile (being perhaps only local and contingent) and therefore the possibility that such compromises may break down at critical moments. In the following section, we explore how these ideas help explain the evolution of biotechnology.
Constructing Biotechnology
We trace the development of biotechnology in human therapeutics 2 over a thirty year period from the first demonstration of recombinant DNA techniques in 1973 to the field characterized by a complex network of dedicated biotech firms, pharmaceutical firms, investors and academics that, by around 2003 stabilized in number, organizational form, strategy and financing (Biotechnology Industry Organization 2008). The field of biotechnology has been extensively studied by organizational scholars and its complex story has merited books and articles too numerous to count (for overviews, see Kenney 1986; Kornberg 1995; Pisano 2006; Robbins-Roth 2000) . We therefore do not pretend to offer a full account of the field but rather seek to view 30 years of biotechnology through a particular lens, which we hope will shed light on some important dynamics shaping its evolution. Our analysis highlights entrepreneurial action across three eras. Each one characterized 2 Occurring in parallel was the application of recombinant DNA and other techniques in other fields such as agriculture. Because the industry and market dynamics were quite different in these other contexts, we chose to examine the trajectory of development in human therapeutics only. This allows us to constrain our discussion to a particular set of institutions and actors.
by the stabilization of a different economic logic. However, these trajectories were arrested by moments (1987-1989; 2001-2002) when the compromise over how to define the tests and the evidence of the economic logic broke down, only to be reconstructed in a different form later.
• : 1973-1986 , when biotech came to be seen as a source of novel ("large molecule") human therapeutics developed by independent start-ups in competition with the "small molecule" drugs of pharmaceutical firms.
• Era 2: 1990-2000, when biotech became a set of firms providing a range of biologybased approaches supporting an alternative drug discovery platform to the traditional chemistry-based platforms used by pharmaceutical firms.
• (Cohen et al. 1973) . These results showed that DNA could be introduced into a bacterium and "switched on" to make a protein (Cohen et al. 1973) . A plethora of methods for manipulating, isolating and modifying DNA followed, and in their wake, the potential for an economic logic in the market place and a setting ripe for entrepreneurial action. Of course, biotechnology has a long "pre-history" in both academic research and practical applications that provided the foundations for these important experiments (Kenney 1986 ). Evidence of thousands of years of basic expertise in biotechnology-related techniques is found in accounts of fermentation, beer production and wine making (Legras et al. 2007 ). However, it was in 1953, with the elucidation of the structure of DNA (Watson and Crick 1953) (Edwards 2003; Lerner 1992; Lerner and Merges 1998) . In examining their activities in the market, however, we found that they were far from pure opportunity seekers. Instead, they actively constructed and reconstructed justifications for the value of their firms by arguing for particular tests of value and mobilizing evidence to satisfy those tests.
They instantiated economic logics for biotech in the organizations they built, and, in doing so, they raised millions from private investors and public markets.
The Schumpeterian entrepreneurs were not alone in their efforts to construct the value of biotechnology. Many actors, concerned with their own definitions of value, fought for different understandings of biotechnology and different definitions of the possibilities associated with it.
Hence, biotechnology's economic logics were defined, contested, and stabilized (and sometimes destabilized) not only in the research labs, offices of venture capitalists and biotech startups, but also in the courts, Congressional hearings, government agencies, large pharmaceutical firms, and even in the streets (in political demonstrations).
While the discovery of rDNA techniques made biotechnology's commercial application possible and generated enthusiasm among entrepreneurs, great uncertainty governed how, exactly, these applications would evolve, and how the biotechnology opportunity would be constructed.
Research on the history, economics and sociology of technology has highlighted four domains in which the value of a technology can be established -technical, appropriability, market and ethical, legal and social dimensions. From a technical perspective, the uncertainties are about whether a technology would actually "work" (Dosi 1982) . Concerns about appropriability focus on establishing ownership and rights to future market rents and provide a barrier to entry (Cockburn and Griliches 1988; Levin et al. 1987; Teece 1986 ). Uncertainties about the market focus on the degree to which investors and customers would pay for the technology (Gans and Stern 2000; Roberts and Berry 1985) . Ethical and safety concerns also generate uncertainties (Kevles and Hood 1992; Winner 1977) .
Our analysis of the evolution of biotechnology indicates that there were strong dependencies between those domains. It was not enough to show a technique worked, it was also crucial to demonstrate that the ideas could be owned, that customers or investors would be willing to pay and that the social and human health risks were not too great. As a result, entrepreneurs of all sorts needed to "lash-up" evidence across these four domains in order to achieve compromises about the economic logic. In the sections that follow, we focus on how a constellation of evidence came to support the prevailing economic logic in each era, and, when that compromise failed, how it was reconstructed. These ideas are summarized in Table 1 .
-Insert Table 1 about here -
The first biotech era (1973-1986)

Biotech as new biological drugs in competition with big pharma
The Cohen and Boyer breakthrough made biotechnology techniques practicable for the first time, and many entrepreneurs founded firms in attempts to capture this potential. In the very early days, firms aimed at a wide range of applications in areas as diverse as agriculture, the environment, With a successful IPO, Genentech, its venture backers and investment bankers provided a blue print for a stable economic logic. Other firms followed, shedding their broad, multi-application orientation to focus on biological drugs ("large molecules") for human disease. From 1980 From to 1986 The commercializatoin of monoclonal antibodies follows a similar path to rDNA with many of the same uncertainties.
An important part of the immune system, experiments undertaken at the Medical Research Council laboratories in Cambridge, England in the mid 1970s by Kohler and Milstein (1975) were part of on-going research on the immune system that continued the academic agenda of immunology. However, like rDNA this research showed significant potential for commercial application. The first commercial step was taken in San Diego by Hybritech. propose that the DNA cloning procedures be patented (Hughes 2001; Ku 1983) . While Cohen was reluctant, the filing was made with only one week remaining before the U.S. limits on prior disclosure would have invalidated the patent.
The patent claimed both the process of making and the composition for biologically functional chimeras (mixes of cells from two different species) and its detailed disclosure descriptions provided additional evidence of technical viability. Two years earlier Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist at General Electric's Schenectady laboratories, had also initiated the commercial move, filing for the first patent on a genetically modified organism -a modified form of pseudomonas bacterium that was capable of breaking down of crude oil (Patent # 3,813,316, Chakrabarty 1974; Patent # 4,259,444, Chakrabarty 1981) . In an interview, Chakrabarty described his work: "I just shuffled the genes, changing the characteristics of a bacteria that already existed.
The 'new' bacteria could guzzle the oil in case of oil-spills in seas or rivers, thus saving valuable marine life and preventing environmental degradation" (Chowdhury 2002 It was argued that the Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is patentable subject matter (US Supreme Court 1980).
In allowing the Chakrabarty patent (and by precedent the Cohen and Boyer patent), the judges rejected the arguments that tests of safety or commerce should be used when determining patentability. They found that questions of regulation were for the legislative process -not the courts -and that, "the grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks." Instead, the Court determined the validity of the patent in accordance with the Constitution that anything "under the sun" should be patentable and with the Patent Act of 1952, specifically Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Section 101, describing the kinds of inventions that could be patented. While they did not give credence to the economic arguments proposed by biotechnology firms, the successful outcome of the case provided evidence for the appropriability of invented biotech organisms, which validated the approach being pursued by Genentech. A press release for Genentech said that the Supreme Court's action had "assured this country's technology future" (Genentech 1980 ).
The questions of safety began to recede in the wake of the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision. However, throughout the very early years of biotechnology, actors who defined the value of biotechnology as related to the risk of human or environmental toxicity placed limits on research and commercialization. Universities, city governments, Federal regulatory agencies, activist groups and researchers themselves worked to assure that safety concerns were factored into the approach taken to develop biotechnology.
One response to these pressures was an attempt by researchers at self-regulation. In 1974, a group of researchers -spearheaded by Paul Berg, a scientist at Stanford University who was himself conducting early experiments in recombinant DNA -requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) form a committee to study the safety of conducting research biotech (Lederberg 1975 ). The NAS then convened the Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, which declared a moratorium on further research until scientists could establish guidelines for safety. The following year, more than 100 scientists, lawyers and journalists met under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (which took over from the NAS) at Asilomar State Beach for what has become known as the Asilomar Conference. Their goal was to set guidelines (rather than regulations) on research on rDNA that would allow scientific activity in biotechnology to continue while assuring that risks of mutant genes or toxicity were controlled (Carmen 1985; Diringer 1987 Experimentation Review Board that conducted over 75 hours of hearings during which a broad range of possible outcomes were considered. However, the Federal regulatory process, which was occurring contemporaneously, established a precedent for allowing research, and so the City ultimately decided to encode NIH guidelines into City law. This struggle for influence represented a significant turning point in the contest between regulators and for-profit constituents in influencing a leading institution -in this case the Cambridge City government. The winners argued that the potential health benefits and the economic opportunities outweighed any risks (Wright 1986 Assuring a regime for appropriability and safety paved the way for the further development of biotechnology for human therapeutics. Subsequent advances would be dependent on what kinds of research would be viable in the market and therefore receive funding. Entrepreneurial firms were often in the lead in creating market evidence. One example was the production of human insulin.
Researchers at Genentech worked in 1978 with the City of Hope National Medical Center to show it was possible to produce human insulin using recombinant DNA technology. Robert Swanson, president of Genentech at the time, noted, "The development of human insulin demonstrates the viability of using recombinant DNA technology to produce products with practical application" (Genentech 1978) . 4 Most of the evidence of manufacturability was generated at the small 10-liter laboratory-scale approved by the NIH, although in 1979 Genentech created a minor furor by making organisms for insulin production in batches of 100 liters. They took advantage of ambiguity in the rules to establish more dramatic evidence of rDNA's potential. The tests also allowed Genentech to
show their partner -Eli Lilly -that they could meet important technical milestones in the deal that 4 Note that these attempts to establish viability often came into conflict as Genentech also licensed out the associated patents and was found by courts in 2002 to have concealed this information. The Los Angeles Superior Court awarded the City of Hope Medical Center over $500 million to compensate for losses associated with this collaboration (Hamilton 2002) .
gave Eli Lilly the right produce and distribute recombinant insulin as an alternative to Lilly's bovine insulin (Yansura 2001) .
Another example was the pursuit of Interferon, the first promising lead to emerge from the Genetech's recombinant human insulin, the firm made significant investments in building rDNA production capabilities. In 1980, Hoffmann-La Roche bought rights to market Genentech's interferon and Schering Plough did the same for Biogen's interferon. These deals substantiated the market value of biotechnology among corporate buyers.
However, another critical market test was achieving Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval to distribute biotechnology drugs. Initially, no guidelines for FDA tests existed and the agency sought to incorporate the NIH Guidelines into the design of clinical trials (Federal Register 50, 134 (1978) 
Breakdown of the logic of the first biotech era (1987-1990)
If the story ended here, it would provide a rich, if simple, account of an economic logic constructed around a technology rich in entrepreneurial opportunities and institutional uncertainties.
Yet, this initial "Genentech" model of biotechnology failed as a commercial project. While over $1.4 billion in funding had been raised in the public markets through IPOs, (Lerner and Merges, 1998) , investors began to weary of the fading promise of biotech. By 1986, the FDA had approved only six biotechnology drugs (the three mentioned above and another form of alpha interferon, a monoclonal antibody for graft rejection and lastly Recombivax -the hepatitis B vaccine). The industry was failing tests of commercial viability. Stocks "lapsed into a near comatose languor as investors tired of waiting for all the visionary promises to be fulfilled" (Stevens 1986). The financial markets closed to biotech firms funding only 13 IPOs between 1987 and 1990 compared to 22 in 1986 alone.
How did the compromise, crafted so carefully, fall apart? Howard Greene, former Chairman of San Diego-based biotech firm Hybritech (and a prominent venture investor) described the challenge in 1987: "All it took to form a company five or six years ago was finding a Nobel laureate from one of a dozen illustrious universities who was going to spiritually associate with the company. It was assumed that was all it took to succeed. Now people have found out that, like any business, it takes management," (Kraul 1987 ). However, more than simply a managerial failure on the part of biotech's early Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, the problem lay in the instability of the evidence across all domains, technical, appropriability, safety and the market.
Technical evidence suggested that one of the centerpiece drugs in biotechnology, interferon,
was not as effective a cancer cure as many had hoped (Panem 1984) . Numerous industry observers and scholars noted the disappointing results. An article in the New England Journal of Medicine described that the euphoria surrounding interferon as a "miracle cure for cancer was short lived and faded when it seemed that interferon's performance in large scale cancer trials had been disappointing" (1998: 1231). Interferon often produced a variety of unwanted side effects in patients (Powledge 1984) . Later research would show that interferon could be incorporated into multi-drug therapeutic regimes for cancer treatment and (in different variants) for hepatitis B and C, multiple sclerosis and numerous other indications. However, the particular test chosen by these early biotech firms and scientists -single-drug trials -highlighted evidence bolstering safety concerns while failing to provided technical evidence of efficacy.
This was not limited to rDNA products. There was considerable disappointment with MABs as well, with firms confronting the rejection by the human immune system of MABs made using mouse genes. Regulatory approval procedures became so formidable that industry analysts called for a national panel to facilitate the process. According to Steve Burrill, a high profile industry analyst, "The hurdles are placing a burden on biotech companies to the point they could make that world non-economic" (quoted in, Kraul 1987) . The FDA countered that while the earliest biotech drugs were recombinant versions of widely understood drugs such as insulin, the recent new drug applications were more complex scientifically, particularly the MABs undergoing clinical trials, and the agency had limited expertise in the area (Gibbons 1991) .
Legal evidence of the appropriability of biological drugs also weakened with Genentech Genetic Sciences spent four years clearing legal hurdles and finding a community willing to host its outdoor test of frost-fighting bacteria. Even when a location was approved, opponents tried to prevent the test by destroying thousands of the experimental strawberry plants that served as the material for the bacteria tests during nighttime raids (Diringer 1987) . As a result, market evidence continued to weaken -investors were concerned that there was insufficient interest among pharmaceutical firms in licensing biotech's products (Kraul 1987) .
Constructing a new logic for the second biotech era (1990-2001)
Biotech as a platform for drug discovery and other applications
In the period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , as the biotechnology-as-large-molecule-for-human-therapy trajectory was being pursued, scientists, firms and universities added numerous tools and techniques to biotechnology's toolkit including polymerase chain reaction to amplify DNA, DNA sequencing technologies to decode DNA, and gene chips to map the patterns of DNA in particular tissues and other samples. After the breakdown of the economic logic for biotechnology in the late 1980s, profit-seeking Schumpeterian entrepreneurs shifted from thinking of these tools and techniques as mere enablers of biotechnology to positioning them as biotechnology itself. Rather than drugs, biotechnology would be a platform for the discovery of drugs of any kind -both large-molecule and small. This approach, while connected to the prior biotechnology activities, required new scientific expertise. This "rational" (grounded in biology) drug discovery stood in stark contrast to the trialand-error (grounded in repeated chemistry experiments) approach traditionally used by large pharmaceutical firms (Henderson, Orsenigo and Pisano 1999) .
A few biotech firms -Human Genome Sciences (HGS) and Millennium -came to exemplify the new economic logic in the marketplace. HGS was founded in 1992 by Bill Haseltine, a former scientist at Harvard, and Craig Venter formerly a scientist at the NIH. Rather than focus on particular biological drugs, the company based their business on combining a diverse set of biotechnologies. This discovery platform, they argued, could be used to precisely examine the mechanisms of disease taking place in the human body and provide critical information scientists could use to design drugs to block the disease-causing mechanisms. At the core of their platform was the sequencing and collection of large amounts of genetic information, particularly for very small DNA fragments called Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) whose patentability would be the source of considerably controversy. When HGS successfully completed its IPO in 1993, it provided a blueprint other startups could follow. With a similar logic, a high profile group of academic scientists (including Eric Lander who was leading part of the Human Genome Project) founded Millennium Pharmaceuticals. While Millennium's specific bio-technologies focused on targeted gene sequencing and the identification of gene function, like HGS, the firm was also an important model that other entrepreneurs followed, especially after completing an extremely successful IPO in 1996. Rather than focusing on single drugs, the new logic allowed firms to combine a collection of diverse bio-technologies to build a drug discovery "platform" -a novel combination of tools and the information essential for the new rational approach to drug discovery. By 1997, these firms captured over 30 percent of the market capitalization in biotechnology (Cohen 1997 ).
The first challenge for thse startups was to generate technical evidence to bolster their claims. They needed to prove that biotech-based drug discovery platforms were more effective than traditional trial-and-error discovery methods that had dominated the pharmaceutical sector. The test (Ding, Murray and Stuart 2006; Stuart and Ding 2006) . However, these relationships were more likely to focus on testing out specific platform technologies and exploring newly identified drug targets than the joint development of manufacturing expertise or specific therapeutic drugs that had characterized Genentech and the other early firms.
If genetic analysis and discovery tools were to become central to biotech's newly constructed economic logic of drug discovery, evidence of appropriability would be essential.
Patents on biological molecules themselves such as recombinant insulin were not enough. The new platform companies were not constructed to discover these new molecules. Instead they provided critical knowledge that served as an input into the discovery process. The question was what evidence would convince investors that they could appropriate value? Established patent law covered some aspects of the new discovery platforms because they were new techniques to "probe" the genome -equipment, reagents, processes, etc. However, many entrepreneurs wanted to sell the information they discovered. Most of this was information about gene sequences and a complex Robert Gallo, a leading researcher in the field, and his team had discovered that CCR5 was critical for HIV and the HGS share price jumped 21 percent. HGS could directly benefit from the discoveries of others. In response, Gallo was quoted in Science: "As a society, we have to ask if it's fair to give the main commercial prize to the company that simply sequences a gene rather than to those who do the hard work of figuring out its biological function" (Marshall 2000b (Marshall : 1375 . Court as it was not framed around a single patent. Instead, the scientific press (mainly the editorial pages of Science and Nature), as well as the mass media, gave widespread coverage.
This was followed by a variety of Congressional Hearings. Public interest groups, including
ethicists and activists such as Jeremy Rifkin again objected to gene patents but argued for a moral test rather than a utilitarian one: genes should be seen as a sacred code -the blueprint of life (Kevles and Berkowitz 2001) . While a gene patent did not equate to the ownership of a person, the very notion of property rights on a human gene violated human dignity. Other vocal opponents included representatives of disease foundations whose funding went towards solving complex and life threatening diseases. They argued that gene patents would increase the price of genetic tests to diagnose life threatening diseases (Merz 1999) . Moreover, they argued, patients with breast cancer, Canavan disease and PXE disease whose genes formed the basis for gene patents should, they contended, have a right to the research results. These patients spoke out vocally at Congressional
Hearings (Merz 1999; Nature 1996) .
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms were divided in their view of the value of gene sequence patents. In Congressional hearings, press statements and at the National Academy of Sciences, the newer startups, such as HGS, pointed to the extensive investments in new biological drugs enabled by strong patent rights on human genes of therapeutic importance. The Association of Biotechnology Companies endorsed EST patents (Eisenberg 1992). However, the more established biotechnology firms, those that survived from the first biotechnology era, worried that strong patent claims on gene fragments would crowd the patent landscape for their research and make it more difficult for them to make money on biological drugs. Their position was represented by the Industrial Biotechnology Association which argued that while a company might be willing to pay a single licensing fee to access to a full gene for drug development, they were reluctant to sign multiple licenses on a plethora of gene fragments that happened to map to a gene that they had discovered through long and costly R&D (Henry et al. 2002) .
Nevertheless, by 1997, the USPTO had issued over 400 human gene sequence patents providing evidence for appropriability of gene sequences and some DNA fragments (Jensen and Murray, 2005) . Under continued pressure, the USPTO continued to seek guidance on this issue, inviting comment on its newly proposed utility guidelines for gene patenting. Corporations again expressed concern that if gene fragment patents might constitute sufficient prior art, patents on complete genes would be precluded, thus undermining their claims on certain appropriability (U.S. In 1991, the Government Operations subcommittee on government information held two hearings on legislation proposed to protect the privacy of genetic information. According to
Congressman Robert E. Wise (D-West Virginia), chairman of the subcommittee: "One of the most serious and most immediate concerns is that genetic information may be used to create a new genetic underclass...People may be unable to obtain jobs and insurance, or participate in other routine activities, because of the stigma of having an undesirable gene" (quoted in Breeder 1991).
The privacy of genetic information was also considered by the California legislature, which passed a bill prohibiting genetic discrimination by employers or insurers (California Government Code: § §12926, 12926.1 (2001), 1998), a requirement that extended not only to genetic testing but also to the use of family histories (Nedelcu et al. 2004) . The emergence of these concerns pointed out that, even as some evidence might be stabilized, new vectors of concern could be opened (in this case privacy) and had to be confronted.
The question remained whether pharmaceutical firms, the target customer for these new platform-based biotechnology firms, would pay a substantial price for drug discovery services. It was increasingly recognized that large pharmaceutical firms were experiencing a problem with R&D productivity. The number of new drug approvals was stable while spending on drug development continued to rise (DiMasi 2001). Patent expirations on blockbuster products would leave the pharma companies searching for new product opportunities that might be filled by new biotech discovery techniques (Teitelman and Coletti 1989) . This left pharmaceutical companies with underused sales capacity and declining profits.
To translate this crisis into demand for their services, new biotechnology startups had to find established pharmaceutical companies willing to pay for their drug discovery tools. Just as Genentech's deal with Eli Lilly provided critical market evidence for biotech firms in the first biotechnology era, in this era, it was a $125 million HGS deal with SmithKline Beecham to provide access to HGS's database of genetic codes that validated this new model. HGS CEO Bill Haseltine took credit for creating the market evidence needed (Edwards and Hamilton 1998) :
"This is the deal that changed everything. It was the shot, the deal that has transformed the life sciences. Now, you see a shift away from an industry based on chemistry to an industry based on genes . .
.What we did --me personally --I was the first one to realize the practical application of this new gene discovery."
The deal established the value of information about genes for drug discovery. Haseltine argued that, "The value is now from the ability to work with genes" (quoted in, Edwards and Hamilton 1998 These deals, following on the heels of successful IPOs by HGS (1993) and Millennium (1996) , secured vital market evidence for the economic logic of platform-based discovery.
Entrepreneurs also used the achievement of milestones in alliance relationships to provide evidence that their technology was validated by thorough scientifically trained experts with full access to the 
Breakdown and reconstruction of the biotechnology economic logic in the 2000s
Biotech firms discover drugs for specific diseases in partnership with big pharma These two events undermined much of the evidence for appropriability of gene sequences.
On the regulatory side, patient advocates who had earlier spoken out against ownership of genes became more vocal. In his presidential address to the American College of Medical Genetics, Dr.
Edward McCabe described the challenges of gene patenting and for-profit use of genetics and genomics more broadly. He cited a pending lawsuit brought by the parents of children with Canavan disease against Miami Children's Hospital. Having provided samples for the development of a diagnostic test, the families claimed the lack of access and high test price to be inappropriate.
The Pseudozanthoma Elasticum (PZXE) Foundation for children with this disease took the more dramatic measure of seeking patent rights on a test developed using their samples. The firm acquired COR Therapeutics for over $2 billion to gain access to the revenues from their approved cardiovascular drug. They also made acquisitions in oncology. Others like Incyte, chose to continue selling genomic information but also narrowed the applications of their discovery platforms to focus on one or a few diseases. In Incyte's case, the program they selected was a smallmolecule program in inflammation initiated through the acquisition of Maxia.
Because of questions about appropriability (patents would provide protection for drug molecules but not genes sequences), doing licensing or other deals in the early phases of research was no longer practicable. As a result, biotechnology firms had to acquire more expertise in the downstream analysis and testing of drugs -proteins, MABs and small molecules -(a capability they had previously relied on their large pharmaceutical firm partners to provide). While this did not replace their academic licensing, sponsored research and partnership activities, it did refocus their activities towards the clinic. This enabled deals to be struck in later phases where biotechnology startups and pharmaceutical firms could collaborate on moving drugs into clinical trials. These The model that emerged in the 2000s is one in which biotech firms, whose core technologies came either from academia or from established firms, raised substantial early-stage investment from venture capitalists. As they developed their bio-technologies in pursuit of novel drugs (proteins, MABs, small molecules and today even RNAi, gene therapy, antisense etc.), they sought partnerships with big pharma to share in the costs, risks and benefits of drug development.
Conversely, big pharma relied on biotech firms to explore risky new drug discovery approaches and targets and to find the most interesting technologies emerging from universities. "Biotechnology" has therefore come to mean a certain way of organizing drug research and development. Biotech is less about specific, narrowly defined bio-technologies per se and more about an organizational form and its associated economic logic. The stability of this compromise over time will depend on the degree to which the links between this set of tests and evidence are durable, uncontested and maintained over time.
Discussion & Conclusion
In our analysis of the evolution of biotechnology, we take a conventionalist lens to focus on the value associated with biotechnology in the marketplace over a thirty-year period; how it was defined, changed and stabilized. We show that what biotechnology was understood to be and how it was seen to create value changed dramatically over the course of the first 30 years of the industry.
While initially hailed as an exciting but narrowly thought of as a biological technique that could be used in wide ranging applications, it was quickly defined as a means to discover and produce large molecule protein drugs, biotechnology. Only after thirty years did entrepreneurs, executives, investors, academics and even social activists come to regard biotechnology as a widely encompassing set of technologies used for more effectively discovering and developing a plethora of therapeutic drugs -large molecule and small. With this stable definition of value came a clearly delineated industrial field, constituted through a complex network of interactions between dedicated biotech firms, large pharmaceutical firms, venture capital, capital markets, universities, and lawyers.
Biotechnology's path was not inevitable; many untrodden paths might have been taken. Had uncertainties been resolved in different ways, by different actors, with different evidence of what could be of value, the trajectory biotechnology took would have been different. We contend that it is through entrepreneurial efforts by multiple actors that the particular path was constructed.
Entrepreneurs mobilized a wide range of evidence, established tests that matched their evidence, and attempted to influence the interpretation of evidence provided by others. The outcomes of their efforts shaped the direction that biotechnology took -as a technology, and as a field within the marketplace instantiated in specific organizations and institutions. The economic logic for biotechnology in the marketplace was the one that sustained a particular set of justifications for at least a period of time and ultimately came to stabilize a particular organizational form. This perspective has broad implications for our understanding of technical change and value construction and of the role of entrepreneurial actors in these processes.
The study of technical change has evolved over the years from one that portrayed technology as an exogenous shock to one that has acknowledge the social forces at play. Research has shown that the evolution of a technology is not simply the inevitable result of "normal problem solving" (Dosi 1982: 152) but rather socially and organizationally constructed (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987) . Further, recent models suggest that this social construction involves the interpretive processes of multiple actors in scientific, governmental, commercial and other spheres of action (Garud and Rappa 1994; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008; Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2003) . These models suggest that different actors bring different interests, different perspectives, and different experiences to the table as they interpret a technology, make choices and act. Because actors may conflict, they engage in contests to get their own interpretation to predominate. By using conventionalist theory as a lens for exploring this process, we show that the struggle over interpretations is not just about the technology itself but also about what value(s) should be attached to it. Constructing a technology thus is also about constructing the economic logic that underpins it.
This perspective also suggests that various institutions are both actors and arenas in these struggles (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008) . They can be sources of uncertainty (as when regulators are unclear about standards or activist groups challenge existing rules) and also decision-makers who resolve uncertainties and in doing so provide evidence for one particular economic logic over others (Teece 1986) , the contestation of patent rights in the Courts and in government agencies highlights the flexibility of the legal framework and its potential to be constructed as technology is constructed (Murray and Stern 2008) . This highlights the ways in which the field and its institutional setup coevolves with the construction of the technology.
We find that, in the case of biotechnology, the entrepreneurial actor plays a critical role in this construction. From this we can make three contributions to the understanding of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. First, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs do not simply identify opportunities that exist "out there," start up new companies or seek venture capital (Shane 2000) . Nor do they merely mold their technology to the institutional set-up (Hargadon and Douglas 2001) . Entrepreneurs construct the very landscape in which they operate. This is not just the social construction of technology but also the social construction of the economic, and therefore of the organizations and institutions that instantiate a particular economic logic. As a result, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are also institutional entrepreneurs (Fligstein 2001 ) who, through their actions, shape the whole set of conventions that will govern value and exchange in a particular sphere of action. They break from existing conventions with the goal of finding new ways to create and justify value.
Second, the central job for the entrepreneur, if one takes the conventionalist lens, is not only to build an organization but also to identify, establish or challenge particular tests of value and mobilize or dispute evidence that would justify value according to these tests. They can use different means to generate evidence: obtaining funding, applying for or litigating a patent, launching product, securing favorable regulations, or establishing deal terms with partners. The organization is therefore not only the product of their efforts but also part of the process for justifying an economic logic. Success in building an organization (as validated by obtaining patents, getting FDA drug approvals, achieving milestones in alliances, doing licensing deals, or conducting a successful IPO) becomes evidence of the validity of a particular approach. It also plays a central role in establishing the categories that investors use in the evaluation of firms (Zuckerman 1999) .
As a result, what is of value becomes endogenized in the actual process of entrepreneurship (Garud and Karnøe 2001) . As definitions of value are resolved, the categories that shape financial markets also emerge endogenously, highlighting the critical role of entrepreneurs in enabling commensuration, investment, and valuation (Espeland and Stevens 1998; Zuckerman 2004 ).
Third, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are not the only entrepreneurial actors who attempt to shape the economic logic of a technology. Our analysis of the biotechnology story places many institutional entrepreneurs in sharp relief -scientists, city governments, regulatory agencies, lawyers, judges, etc. -who contributed to the establishment of justifications for particular economic logics. These other entrepreneurs operated alongside Schumpeterian entrepreneurs in influencing the evolution of a technological field. We should think of these entrepreneurial actors then, not just as the mythical heros of startup ventures but also as the executives of established firms seeking to profit from a new technology, civil servants in governmental agencies seeking to prevent risks, judges interpreting patent law, and activists giving expression to their social conscience.
From this portrayal, we conclude that constructing a technology is deeply intertwined with the construction of organizations and of the institutions that will govern their operation.
Conventionalist theory provides the micro-level underpinnings to the macro-level phenomena in the field (Biggart and Beamish 2003) . It gives us a conceptual apparatus for exploring the micro-level processes by which new technologies emerge and find a market and how the practices in those markets get institutionalized (Fligstein and Dauter 2007) . By suggesting that technologies are economic constructions shaped by the on-the-ground actions of entrepreneurial actors battling to get a particular economic logic to predominate, we highlight the emergent nature of coordination in markets (Latsis 2006) , and we show how institutions get created and changed in addition to how they eventually become congealed (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007) . Reciprocally, we show that an economic logic breaks down if it does not sustain a set of justifications. Stabilized economic logics may only be "provisional settlements" (Girard and Stark 2002) that are specific to a certain place
and time. This analysis shows that the development of technologies and organizations, as well as the institutions in which they are embedded, are intimately intertwined, and highlights the immense entrepreneurial effort required to construct the economic that shapes their emergence.
As this paper is part of a volume devoted to the impact of Joan Woodward's work, we want to point out how our conventionalist understanding of technology commercialization and valuation has its roots in her concerns with the relationship between new technologies and organizations (Woodward 1958 
